Since i think we're all finding this a bit difficult, i'l just try and pick out some sort of criticism of Sartre's notion of Bad faith...
Is it impractical to believe that we can do exactly what we want to do all the time? And does it take into account a set of morals that as human beings we posses? Even inert morals that come about with our conscience? We don't do certain things, even if we really want to, because we realise the affects they will have on another person. The mistake Sartres points out that we are making is that we believe that "i am not a person who would do such a thing" although i think this is too much of an assumption. Does it not disregard the fact that we inherently know that certain things are morally wrong, and so we resist our urges to do so in order for society to run smoothly??
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I think you made an interesting observation in questioning; “Does it not disregard the fact that we inherently know that certain things are morally wrong, and so we resist our urges to do so in order for society to run smoothly?”
ReplyDeleteI would further this argument and suggest that Bad Faith is a form of self-deception which leaves us to question our being and in following Sartre’s notion we will always define ourselves as consciously not what we are aware of.
An example of Bad Faith can be found in this example; a devout Catholic teenager would like to have sex before marriage, but pressures from her congregation and family convince her not to. In her opinion societal expectations and values, which are not essentially her own is keeping her from living how she desires, but in continuing to deny herself that true freedom it is her own Bad Faith.
Sartre follows in suggesting; ‘In truth, I have not persuaded myself; to the extent that I could be so persuaded’. ‘And at the very moment when I was disposed to put myself in bad faith, I of necessity was in bad faith’. (Sartre, J.P. 2000).
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Sartre, J.P (2000). Patterns of Bad Faith. In: Being and Nothingness. London: Routledge, pp68.